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Government	statistical	agencies	collect	enormously	valuable	data	on	the	nation's	population	
and	business	activities.		Wide	access	to	these	data	enables	evidence-based	policy	making,	
supports	new	research	that	improves	society,	facilitates	training	for	students	in	data	science,	
and	provides	resources	for	the	public	to	better	understand	and	participate	in	their	society.		
These	data	also	affect	the	private	sector.		For	example,	the	Employment	Situation	in	the	United	
States,	published	by	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics,	moves	markets.		Nonetheless,	government	
agencies	are	under	increasing	pressure	to	limit	access	to	data	because	of	a	growing	
understanding	of	the	threats	to	data	privacy	and	confidentiality.				
“De-identification”	—	stripping	obvious	identifiers	like	names,	addresses,	and	identification	
numbers	—	has	been	found	inadequate	in	the	face	of	modern	computational	and	informational	
resources	(Sweeney	2007;	Narayanan	and	Shmatikov	2006;	Narayanan	and	Shmatikov	2010;	
Sweeney	2013;	see	also	the	report	of	the	President’s	Council	of	Advisors	on	Science	and	
Technology	2014).		
Unfortunately,	the	problem	extends	even	to	the	release	of	aggregate	data	statistics	(Dinur	and	
Nissim	2003;	Dwork,	McSherry,	and	Talwar	2007;	Homer	et	al.	2008;	Kasiviswanathan,	
Rudelson,	Smith,	and	Ullman	2010;	De	2012;	Kasiviswanathan,	Rudelson,	and	Smith,	2013;	
Muthukrishnan	and	Nikolov	2012;	Dwork	et	al	2015).		This	counter-intuitive	phenomenon	has	
come	to	be	known	as	the	Fundamental	Law	of	Information	Recovery.		It	says	that	overly	
accurate	estimates	of	too	many	statistics	can	completely	destroy	privacy.		One	may	think	of	this	
as	death	by	a	thousand	cuts.		Every	statistic	computed	from	a	data	set	leaks	a	small	amount	of	
information	about	each	member	of	the	data	set	–	a	tiny	cut.		This	is	true	even	if	the	exact	value	
of	the	statistic	is	distorted	a	bit	in	order	to	preserve	privacy.		But	while	each	statistical	release	is	
an	almost	harmless	little	cut	in	terms	of	privacy	risk	for	any	individual,	the	cumulative	effect	can	
be	to	completely	compromise	the	privacy	of	some	individuals.	Since	statistical	releases	serve	
useful	purposes,	statistical	bureaus	must	strategically	choose	which	cuts	to	inflict,	while	
protecting	privacy	overall.	The	problem	is	especially	acute	given	the	level	of	detail	at	
which	these	bureaus	collect	and	release	data	periodically.	The	Census	Bureau,	for	example,	
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plans	to	publish	several	billion	statistical	summaries	from	the	2020	Census	of	Population	and	
Housing.	
The	Fundamental	Law	of	Information	Recovery	has	troubling	implications	for	the	publication	of	
large	numbers	of	statistics	by	a	statistical	agency:	it	says	that	the	confidential	data	may	be	
vulnerable	to	database	reconstruction	attacks	based	entirely	on	the	data	published	by	the	
agency	itself.	Left	unattended,	such	risks	threaten	to	undermine,	or	even	eliminate,	the	societal	
benefits	inherent	in	the	rich	data	collected	by	the	nation's	statistical	agencies.		The	most	
pressing	immediate	problem	for	any	statistical	agency	is	how	to	modernize	its	disclosure	
limitation	methods	in	light	of	the	Fundamental	Law.	
The	technical	challenge	to	the	federal	statistical	agencies	is	to	quantify	the	inferential	disclosure	
(privacy	loss)	and	mathematically	bound,	or	control,	it	for	the	complete	publication	plan	for	any	
set	of	confidential	data	inputs;	that	is,	quantify	the	sum	of	many	“tiny”	privacy	cuts.	Differential	
privacy,	a	definition	of	privacy	and	a	collection	of	supporting	algorithmic	techniques	tailored	for	
privacy-preserving	statistical	analysis	of	large	datasets,	provides	such	a	measure	of	privacy	loss,	
together	with	the	tools	to	analyze	and	control	cumulative	loss	accruing	over	multiple	
publications	(Dwork,	McSherry,	Nissim,	and	Smith,	2006;	Dwork,	2006).		In	principle,	using	this	
technology,	an	agency	can	set	a	privacy-loss	“budget”,	measured	in	the	units	supplied	by	
differential	privacy,	and	ensure	that	its	entire	publication	plan	stays	within	budget.		It	can	
prioritize	certain	statistics,	using	a	larger	share	of	the	budget	and	having	better	accuracy,	and	
lower	the	priority	on	others,	resulting	in	less	privacy	budget	consumption	but	worse	accuracy	
for	these	lower	priority	products.	
This	apparent	“match	made	in	heaven”	between	differential	privacy	and	the	needs	of	a	
statistical	agency	holds	great	promise	but	requires	great	effort.		There	are	two	principal	areas	of	
difficulty:	1) The	Fundamental	Law	of	Information	Recovery	can	no	more	be	circumvented	than	can	
the	laws	of	physics.		Consider	the	billions	of	statistical	summaries	planned	for	the	2020	
Census	of	Population	and	Housing.		If	Census	imposes	a	binding	privacy-loss	ceiling	on	
these	publications,	how	will	that	budget	be	distributed	across	the	competing	interests	
of	accuracy	for	legislative	redistricting	(detail	at	small	geographic	levels--census	blocks)	
versus	data	on	small	subpopulations	(detail	on	many	ethnic	and	racial	minorities)?	No	
statistical	agency	has	ever	had	to	examine	its	publication	policies	under	the	glare	of	an	
explicit	privacy-loss	budget.	Yet,	that	is	precisely	what	is	demanded	by	acknowledging	
the	Fundamental	Law.		2) Differential	privacy	is	a	young	field.	The	literature	is	silent	on	crucial	preprocessing	
steps,	such	as	imputation	of	missing	fields	and	other	aspects	of	data	cleaning.		
Algorithmic	challenges	specific	to	the	statistical	agencies	are	just	now	being	formulated,	
and	their	solution	will	be	the	subject	of	doctoral	dissertations	as	yet	unwritten.		Better	
techniques	are	needed	to	communicate	the	error	experienced	by	analysts.		Expertise	in	
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differential	privacy	–	introduced	a	scant	decade	ago	--	is	geographically	scattered.		
Recently	announced	adoption	of	the	approach	by	Apple	and	Google	will	draw	talent	
away	from	the	public	and	research	sectors.		To	use	formal	privacy-preserving	disclosure	
limitation	methods	for	the	2020	Census,	the	methods	must	be	developed,	tested,	and	
subjected	to	scientific	scrutiny	before	the	conclusion	of	the	2018	End-to-end	test	
(roughly,	February	2019).	
	
A	national	Virtual	Center	for	Differential	Privacy	(V-CDP)	could	harness	talent	to	address	the	
privacy-preserving	data	analysis	challenges	of	the	federal	statistical	system.		The	techniques	
and	artifacts	developed	would	be	useful	to	statistical	agencies,	as	well	as	industry,	but	it	is	the	
Census	Bureau	that	has	recognized	the	need	for	formal	privacy	guarantees	and	is	reaching	out	
for	help	from	the	research	community.			
Structure	
	
A	V-CDP	could	build	an	infrastructure	and	a	set	of	tools	and	techniques	for	safeguarding	the	
privacy	of	individuals	and	groups,	while	allowing	for	valuable	analyses	of	census	data.		The	
driving	idea	for	this	V-CDP	is	that	major	new	algorithmic	breakthroughs	are	needed	if	we	want	
to	be	able	to	return	results	that	are	sufficiently	accurate	for	their	statistical	purposes,	while	
staying	within	a	meaningful	privacy	budget1.		Current	approaches	are	too	ad	hoc	and	frequently	
do	not	achieve	anything	close	to	the	best	trade-offs	between	accuracy	and	privacy.	Researchers	
in	computer	science	and	statistics	are	key	people	needed	to	carry	out	this	agenda.		The	highest	
priorities	for	the	V-CDP	would	be	the	design	of	techniques	needed	for	analyzing	data	from	the	
2020	Census	of	Population	and	Housing,	the	2017	Economic	Census,	and	the	annual	American	
Community	Surveys	going	forward.	
	
The	Virtual	Center	for	Differential	Privacy	would	convene	computer	scientists,	statisticians,	
mathematicians,	and	economists	in	sustained	interactions	and	collaborations	and	will	provide	
many	resources	and	modes	of	collaboration	to	its	participants:	
1) It	would	be	a	repository	for	public	decennial	census	data	and	annual	data	from	
American	Community	Surveys.	There	will	be	enough	computing	power	at	the	center	for	
members	to	remotely	run	software	on	data	at	the	center.			
2) It	would	serve	as	a	repository	for	papers	and	software	developed.	
3) It	would	have	the	technology	to	act	as	a	hub	for	state-of-the-art	videoconferencing	
between	members.	
                                                
1 Differential privacy offers a measure of privacy loss and tools for understanding how this loss 
accumulates over multiple computations.  This makes it possible to specify a “privacy loss budget” and to 
ensure that the cumulative privacy loss stays within the budget. 
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The	V-CDP	would	have	a	managing	board	consisting	of	a	representative	of	the	Census	Bureau,	
together	with	a	computer	scientist	and	a	statistician	with	affiliations	outside	the	census	bureau.		
Casting	A	Wider	Net		
	
To	bring	modern	privacy	techniques	into	the	federal	statistical	system	requires	the	knowledge,	
experience,	and	perspectives	of	multiple	disciplines.		These	include	not	only	computer	
scientists,	statisticians,	and	applied	mathematicians--all	of	whom	have	contributed	to	the	
development	of	privacy-preserving	methods	and	bring	essential	and	complementary	skills	to	
the	V-CDP--but	also	social	and	behavioral	scientists,	legal	scholars,	and	government	employees,	
to	name	a	few.		Social	and	behavioral	scientists	focus	the	algorithm	development.	They	help	
answer	the	question:	With	a	limited	privacy	budget,	where	should	the	published	data	be	most	
accurate?		Legal	scholars	are	needed	to	ensure	that	products	satisfy	regulatory	and	ethical	
obligations	to	protect	privacy	while	also	meeting	reporting	requirements	typical	for	federal	
statistical	data.		We	look	for	opportunities	for	feedback	loops:	Advances	in	privacy-preserving	
methods	could	point	the	way	to	better	laws.	For	example,	most	federal	laws	focus	on	risks	of	
re-identification	in	data,	but	a	focus	on	inferential	disclosures	would	result	in	both	greater	
protection	and	more	accuracy.		Finally,	active	participants	from	the	federal	statistical	system	
are	needed	to	steer	algorithm	development	toward	the	practical	problems	of	interest,	so	that	
methods	are	implemented	to	create	genuinely	useful	data	products.		Experienced	producers	of	
federal	statistics	bring	a	wealth	of	“on-the-ground”	experience	with	these	data	products	to	the	
V-CDP:	How	the	data	are	collected;	how	missing	and	erroneous	values	arise	and	are	handled;	
what	secondary	users	expect	the	federal	agencies	to	share.		In	short,	developing	and	
implementing	formally	private	algorithms	to	create	safe	and	useful	federal	data	products	
requires	interdisciplinary	collaborations	on	the	scope	of	a	V-CDP.	
Education	
	
Education	is	an	important	tool	for	the	sustained	adoption	of	differentially	private	and	other	
provably	private	methodologies	for	releasing/accessing	sensitive	federal	datasets.	At	least	four	
communities	will	be	stakeholders	in	an	ecosystem	that	allows	safe	access	to	sensitive	data:		
1. Inventors/Designers	of	safe	release	practices:	These	might	include	computer	scientists,	
statisticians	and	applied	mathematicians	who	will	design	the	next	generation	of	
algorithms	for	safe	release	of	federal	data	while	ensuring	that	the	data	remain	useful	to	
tackle	the	novel	challenges	that	arise	from	federal	datasets	(high	dimensionality,	
complex	data	types,	graphs,	longitudinal	data,	etc.)	Education	for	this	community	would	
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include	a	thorough	understanding	of	the	basics	of	differential	privacy	and	other	formal	
privacy	notions,	and	the	algorithmic	advances	thus	far	in	this	field.	There	are	courses	in	
academic	institutions	(e.g.,	UPenn,	Duke,	Harvard),	tutorials	(e.g.	VLDB	16	tutorial)	and	
books	(Dwork-Roth)	that	cover	the	algorithmic	aspects	of	differential	privacy	and	other	
formal	privacy	notions,	as	well	as	techniques	for	releasing	and	analyzing	sensitive	data,	
which	could	be	collated	into	a	MOOC	style	course.	These	courses	should	also	expose	
inventors	to	the	typical	uses	of	data	(regression,	log	linear	modeling,	imputation,	data	
cleaning,	etc)	so	that	end-to-end	provably	private	methodologies	can	be	designed.	
2. Users	of	released	data:	These	typically	include	economists,	social	scientists	and	others	
who	use	data	released	by	federal	agencies	on	a	regular	basis.	While	formal	privacy	
techniques	can	release	synthetic	data	that	look	like	real	data,	an	astute	data	user	must	
know	that	such	data	can	only	be	trusted	for	certain	aggregate	analyses	and	not	for	other	
more	fine-grained	analyses.	Moreover,	an	understanding	of	how	data	are	perturbed	can	
help	design	new	analysis	methods	that	can	extract	more	utility	from	the	released	data.	
Education	for	this	community	might	include	online	courses,	like	the	one	at	Cornell	
University	on	the	use	of	synthetic	data	(Abowd	and	Vilhuber),	and	basics	of	private	data	
release	and	analysis.		
3. Deployers	of	release	practices:	Due	to	the	volume	and	variety	of	data	released	by	
federal	agencies,	we	envision	that	not	all	deployers	of	release	methodologies	are	
inventors	of	privacy	algorithms.	While	deployers	need	training	on	the	basics	of	
differential	privacy	(privacy	budgets,	building	blocks,	etc)	they	also	need	a	good	
understanding	of	the	space	of	solutions	that	are	applicable	for	their	data	and	analysis	
needs,	as	well	as	a	good	understanding	of	the	privacy/utility	tradeoffs	on	benchmark	
datasets.	In	addition	to	lectures/tutorials	on	privacy,	expert-vetted	open	source	
implementations	of	privacy	algorithms	(e.g.,	PSI)	and	visualizations	of	their	performance	
on	benchmark	datasets	(e.g.,	DPComp.org)	would	be	great	resources	for	deployers.	
4. Policy	makers	around	what	constitutes	a	safe	release:	Finally,	there	has	to	be	a	dialogue	
between	policy	makers	and	inventors	of	privacy	definitions	and	algorithms.	This	
dialogue	is	essential	to	help	develop	the	next	generation	of	regulations	that	go	beyond	
simple	measures	like	re-identification	and	safe	harbor.	We	envision	developing	courses	
jointly	with,	say,	privacy	law	scholars	and	computer	scientists	wherein	mathematical	
underpinnings	of	formal	privacy	notions	(e.g.,	the	fundamental	law	of	information	
disclosure,	why	Bayesian	risk	factors	are	the	right	measure	for	privacy	loss	and	their	
interpretation,	etc.)	are	communicated	to	policy	makers,	while	current	policy	and	
regulations	are	communicated	with	inventors	of	mathematical	privacy	definitions.		
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